Ekonomska teorija generalne prevencije

Osnovna pitanja

Autori

  • Boris Begović Univerzitet u Beogradu, Pravni fakultet, Srbija i Centar za liberalno-demokratske studije

Ključne reči:

generalna prevencija; očekivana vrednost kazne; novčana kazna; rizik; transfer blagostanja

Apstrakt

Cilj rada je da metodologijom ekonomske nauke, a na osnovu dosadašnjih doprinosa u oblasti ekonomske teorije kriminala, razmotri osnovna teorijska pitanja generalne prevencije. Analiza je usredsređena na teorijska pitanja optimalnog nivoa generalne prevencije i optimalne kompozicije faktora generalne prevencije – zaprećene kazne i verovatnoće njene primene. Optimalni nivo generalne prevencije uvek je, usled postojanja njenih troškova, niži od maksimalnog. Budući da se razlikuju funkcije troškova verovatnoće primene kazne i troškova zaprećene kazne, tako da su veći troškovi povećanja verovatnoće primene kazne, optimalna kombinacija faktora generalne prevencije zasniva se na maksimalnom iznosu zaprećene novčane kazne. Novčana kazna je ekonomski najefikasnija vrsta kazne, budući da su njeni društveni troškovi zanemarljivi. Ta vrsta kazne predstavlja transfer blagostanja: umanjenje blagostanja kažnjenika kompenzovano je uvećanjem blagostanja korisnika budžetskih sredstava, odnosno poreskih obveznika. Maksimalan iznos novčane kazne je individualizovan i zavisi od ukupnog bogatstva prestupnika. Razmatranja pokazuju da postoje teorijska i praktična ograničenja u pogledu primene ovako definisane optimalne kazne. Stoga se i pristupa modifikaciji navedenog optimuma, imajući u vidu problem marginalne kazne, povezanost visine zaprećene kazne i verovatnoće njene primene, situaciju nedovoljnog iznosa bogatstva prestupnika u odnosu na težinu krivičnog dela koje je učinio, kao i napuštanje pretpostavke o neutralnosti pojedinaca ka riziku. Pokazalo se, ukoliko je koeficijent elastičnosti očekivane vrednosti kazne u odnosu na zaprećenu kaznu veći od jedinice i ukoliko potencijalni prestupnici imaju averziju prema riziku, da je optimalni iznos zaprećene kazne manji od maksimalnog.

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30.06.2010

Kako citirati

Begović, Boris. 2010. „Ekonomska Teorija Generalne Prevencije: Osnovna Pitanja“. Crimen 1 (1):50-65. https://epub.ius.bg.ac.rs/index.php/crimenjournal/article/view/609.

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