• Sava Vojnovic
Keywords: Alexy, Radbruch, Justice, Corectness, Nonpositivism


            In trying to unravel the quandary of the concept of law, Robert Alexy stipulated some sort of an eclectic non-postivistic theory of law which consists of three arguments: from Correctness, Injustice and Principles. He believes in the possibility of a rational justification of objective morality, which he incorporates into the aforementioned three arguments, claiming that law and morality are conceptually connected. This paper will question the limitations of such an approach. The Argument from Correctness states that no system can be considered to have a legal nature if it does not claim correctness, while it will be seen as defective if it does claim, but does not fulfill correctness. On the other hand, the Argument from Injustice is an addition to the previous thesis, through the revitalization of the Radbruch Intolerability and Disavowal Formula – subtracting legal nature from extremely unjust norms. The paper evaluates main objections pointed towards such a conception of law, as well as general problems which may occur within the Arguments from Correctness and Injustice.


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