JUDGES, LANGUAGE, AND LEGAL INTERPRETATION: A REPLY TO CRITICS
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.51204/IVRS_24205AKeywords:
Philosophy of Law, Legal Interpretation, Judicial Interpretation of Law, Norms, Normative StatementsAbstract
The article clarifies the theory of legal interpretation introduced in the monograph “Nature and determinants of judicial interpretation of law” regarding the criticisms by Miodrag Jovanović, Goran Dajović and Aleš Novak. Special emphasis is placed on the problems of (1) the relationship between judicial interpretation of law, scientific interpretation of law, and lay interpretation of law, (2) the relationship between natural language and the default understanding of natural language and legal language, as well as (3) determinants that influence the judicial interpretation of law. In connection with these problems, the author draws the following conclusions: (1) judicial interpretation of law, in contrast to scientific and lay interpretation, represents interpretation in a normative function, and judges attribute one of the possible normative meanings to legal texts; (2) the normative meanings of legal texts are not determined by their linguistic content, but are the very rules of interpretation that we call linguistic rules that are formulated and contingently respected within the legal profession; (3) legitimate and illegitimate determinants of judicial interpretation in its two meanings – cognitive and volitional – determine the possibilities of normative meanings of legal texts and decisions about the normative meaning of those texts made by judges. The arguments presented in the text join the arguments presented in the monograph as reasons for accepting realistic (anti-formalist) viewpoints in the theory of legal interpretation.
References
Barry, Brian. 2020. How Judges Judge. London: Informa Law from Routledge.
Baude, William, Stephen E. Sachs. 4/2017. The Law of Interpretation. Harvard Law Review 130: 1079–1147.
Baude, William, Ryan D. Doerfler. 2/2018. Arguing with Friends. Michigan Law Review 117: 319–348.
Bulygin, Eugenio. 1982. Norms, normative propositions, and legal statements. 127–152. Philosophy of action/Philosophie de l’action, edited by Guttorm Fløistad. Dordrecht: Springer.
Canale, Damiano, Carlo Penco. 2022. Default reasoning and the law: A dialogue. Revus 47.
Dajović, Goran. 4/2015. Nezakonitost kao razlog neustavnosti zakona. Pravni život 12: 527–542.
Danziger, Shai, Jonathan Levav, Liora Avnaim-Pesso. 17, 2011. Extraneous factors in judicial decisions. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 108: 1–4.
Gigerenzer, Gerd, Christoph Engel. 2006. Heuristics and the law: Dahlem workshop reports, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press in cooperation with Dahlem University Press.
Glynn, Adam N., Maya Sen. 1/2014. Identifying Judicial Empathy: Does Having Daughters Cause Judges to Rule for Women’s Issues? American Journal of Political Science 59: 37–54.
Guastini, Riccardo. 2014. La sintassi del diritto. G. Giappichelli Editore.
Kelsen, Hans. 1951. The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems. London: Stevens & Sons.
Konca, Paulina. 2021. Creating law of interpretation: a risky or fundamental step, Revus 45.
Leiter, Brian. 2007. Naturalizing Jurisprudence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lukić, Radomir. 1961. Tumačenje prava. Beograd: Savremena administracija.
Marmor, Andrei. 2018. Norms, Reasons, and the Law. 95–118. Unpacking Normativity – Conceptual Normative and Descriptive Issues, edited by Kenneth Einar Himma, Miodrag A. Jovanović, Bojan Spaić. New York: Hart Publishing.
Mertz, Elizabeth, William K. Ford, Gregory Matoesian. 2016. Translating the Social World for Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nayak-Young, Stephen. 4/2015. Delimiting the proper bounds of the “New Legal Realism. International Journal of Constitutional Law 12: 1008–1033.
Paulson, Stanley L. 2/2019. Hans Kelsen on legal interpretation, legal cognition, and legal science. Jurisprudence 10: 188–221.
Peczenik, Aleksander. 2005. Scientia Juris: Legal Doctrine as Knowledge of Law and as a Source of Law. Cham: Springer.
Posner, Eric A., Adrian Vermeule. 159, 2016. The Votes of Other Judges. Georgetown Law Journal 105: 158–90.
Prochownik, Karolina, Stefan Magen. 2023. Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Law. New York, NY: Bloomsbury Publishing.
Roughley, Neil. 2019. Might We Be Essentially Normative Animals? 3–37. The Normative Animal?, edited by Neil Roughley, Kurt Bayertz. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schauer, Frederick. 1993. Playing by the Rules. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Spaak, Torben, Mathieu Carpentier. Forthcoming. Sources of Law in Continental Analytical Jurisprudence. Jurisprudence in the Mirror: The Common Law World Meets the Civil Law World, edited by Luka Burazin, Kenneth Einar Himma, Giorgio Pino. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Spaić, Bojan. 2012. Dva „čitanja“ člana 994 Opšteg imovinskog zakonika za Knjaževinu Crnu Goru. 37–67. Spomenica Valtazara Bogišića o stogodišnjici njegove smrti. ur. Luka Breneselović. Beograd: Službeni glasnik – Institut za uporedno pravo.
Spaić, Bojan. 2019. Tumačenje prava u okviru hermenutike Emilia Betija. Beograd: Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu.
Spaić, Bojan. 2020. Priroda i determinante sudijskog tumačenja prava. Beograd: Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu.
Spaić, Bojan. 1/2021. Interpretacija i konstrukcija: prilog razmatranju razlike između primjene prava i stvaranja prava. Pravni zapisi 12: 29–61.
Spaić, Bojan. 2023. Formalism. 987–994. Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, edited by Mortimer Sellers, Stephan Kirste. Springer Netherlands.
Miles, Thomas J., Cass R. Sunstein. 2/2008. The New Legal Realism. The University of Chicago Law Review 75: 831–851.
Van Rooij, Benjamin. 2021. Do People Know the Law? Empirical Evidence about Legal Knowledge and Its Implications for Compliance. 467–488. The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance, edited by Benjamin van Rooij, D. Daniel Sokol. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Vuković, Danilo. Bojan Spaić. 4/2022. Parallel Normative Reality: The Informal Order of Corruption and Clientelism in Serbia. Sociologija LXIV: 519–542.