The reliability of experts in judicial fact-finding
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.51204/IVRS_25104AKeywords:
Deference, Expert, Judge, Reliability, TrustworthinessAbstract
The problem of the development of specialized knowledge is becoming increasingly relevant in legal practice, because of the significant role played by experts in judicial trials. Faced with this problem, legal theory has tried to answer the question about the relationship that is established between the judge and the experts who are summoned in the trials to provide their own knowledge about the matter of the judgement. This article provides an overview of the different theories which have analyzed when an expert deserves the trust of the legal authority. This essay aims to answer two questions: when does a person possess the necessary knowledge to be considered an expert and to what extent does reliance on the expert influence the judge's decision.
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