Pouzdanost stručnjaka u utvrđivanju činjenica u sudskom postupku
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.51204/IVRS_25104AKljučne reči:
Poverenje, Ekspert, Sudija, Pouzdanost, StručnostApstrakt
Problem razvoja specijalizovanog znanja postaje sve značajniji u savremenoj pravnoj praksi, usled istaknute uloge koju stručnjaci imaju u sudskim postupcima. Suočena s tim izazovom, pravna teorija nastoji da odgovori na pitanje o prirodi odnosa koji se uspostavlja između sudije i eksperata pozvanih da pruže svoje stručno znanje o predmetu odlučivanja. Ovaj rad daje pregled različitih teorijskih pristupa koji analiziraju kada stručnjak zaslužuje poverenje pravnog autoriteta. Cilj teksta je da ponudi odgovor na dva ključna pitanja: kada lice poseduje odgovarajuće znanje da bi bilo smatrano stručnjakom i u kojoj meri oslanjanje na eksperta utiče na sudijsku odluku.
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